What ails Bulgarian security and defense policy in the EU?
It is hard to talk about security and defense policy in Bulgaria. Instead, there are pieces of the puzzle here and there, dispersed in different agencies without proper coordination. The new understanding of security as a product of internal security and international crisis management is not yet in the agenda of the relevant institutions. In fact, if I have to be precise, Bulgaria does not even have a strategic vision of its security and defense.
A Lack of everything
Bulgaria lacks adequate National Security Strategy. The current document was made by the Ministry of Defense (Mod) in 1998. The main priorities set therein – as is the case with the Military Strategy (2002) and the Military Doctrine (1999) – do not adequately reflect any more the international security challenges. Instead, priority number one for the country is joining NATO. This happened in 2004. Is this all the security and defense strategy has to say? Definitely not. It is rather where it has to start from.
One of the most up-to-date documents of the Defense ministry – the Strategic Security Review (2004) also leaves behind the debates between NATO and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The future of European, security the new security concepts and even the traditionally strong regional aspects of security are not the in the focus of the strategic thinking. In the last years the leadership of key institutions, especially the Minister of Defense, did all but address the reforms in NATO, the unfolding of ESDP and Bulgaria’s role in these processes. The main activity instead was related to modernization, which was narrowly understood as buying new weapons. Besides, every minister had its own idea how to develop the institution – from a real estate agency to welfare ministry. As a result, strategic planning was completely neglected.
A way to go forward
The lack of understanding about the new European security architecture from the last years was recently supplemented by a huge budgetary crisis. The new team of minister Mladenov quickly showed that policies and procurement deals will be revised. Such revision is long overdue and will take a long time. In the meantime however, we can think how to fill in the strategic gap. It is fundamental for restarting modernization in the army and administration in the right way. And it costs much less.
One of the main policies that the MoD should develop is Bulgaria’s participation in ESDP. Why? Here are a few of them:
- Taking part in ESDP might give the country the political prestige it needs so much in the EU right now
- ESDP can improve institutional and Crisis Management Operation (CMO) experience of the military and other relevant security agencies
- The build-up of the ESDP and its coordination with NATO could be a key reference point in reorganizing and modernizing Bulgaria’s military
- Strong ESDP strengthens the position of the EU at the international scene and helps the stability in the region
A few ideas for Bulgaria’s security and defense policy
First of all, Bulgaria should do its homework and update its security strategy and military doctrine. These documents should specify the role Bulgaria wants for the EU in the world and for itself within ESDP and NATO. The moment could not be more appropriate since now the new strategic concept of NATO is being elaborated and in addition ESDP is soon likely to get new form and institutions after the Lisbon Treaty come into force. The openness of the new MoD leadership should make these processes as transparent as possible and accessible for experts and NGOs. In the last years a number of organizations were entirely forgotten and the expertise gathered in preparation of the NATO accession process is slowly but surely fading away.
Second, traditional strategic documents should be supplemented with a special strategy about Bulgaria’s participation in crisis management operations, and more specifically to set the goals and strategic directions. This is how Bulgaria will move away from the ad hoc approach which so far has only provided for sending 1-2 officer here and there.
3) Bulgaria needs a coherent plan for civilian capability development for CMO. The current personnel policy of MoD 
and the Ministry of Interior do not reflect the new security challenges and the lessons learned from key international operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Creating civil-military units ready to take part in international missions needs new intra-institutional policy. The civil-military capability development plan should include the Ministries of Interior, Justice, Defense and the restructured Ministry of Emergency Situations. These institutions ought to work together in creating at least a few well-trained small units able to take part in monitoring, SSR and state-building missions, etc.
Furthermore, 4), considering the limited finances, Bulgaria should offer niches for operational support in the civilian aspects of ESDP (just like this has happened in NATO). This is not easier, but it is definitely cheaper because civilian operations are covered by the EU, unlike the military missions, which are paid from the national budget. It seems logical that the MoD should be at the very center of such an initiative, but before that, there should be a clear coordination mechanism with the other agencies involved.
Then 5), the civil-military capability plan should be coordinated with the Council Secretariat and other member states. Eventually such consultations may grow into an EU approach to civilian planning, which will be only of benefit to the under-staffed missions of the EU. Currently there are 1500 vacancies, while the mission in Afghanistan has deployed around half of its envisaged personnel. Thus if Bulgaria creates a strategy on this issue and manages a smooth coordination process at home, it can lobby for further steps at EU level, which would bring the country’s diplomacy and expertise in the focus of attention and discussions. Eventually a common planning and standardization process for civilian capabilities may emerge at the EU level.
Even though it is small, the gathered expertise from CMOs should be utilized to full extend. This is why it is necessary to 6) create a specialized best practices and lessons learned unite within the MoD. This unit could create its own expertise based on research and also use the experience obtained in past missions. A good first step is to create an extensive and structured debriefing procedure. It is important to note that even the Council Secretariat does not have such a specialized unit. The lack of constructive criticism and the status quo around the Higher Representative to certain extend blocks a more dynamic and efficient ESDP.
Finally 7), Bulgaria should encourage the Black Sea policy, which is the natural focus of the Neighborhood Policy. The latter is being restarted almost every year, which signals that not everything is running smoothly. Bulgaria is the Southeastern frontier of the EU and has vital interest to use its traditional links, position and experience to develop the EU’s neighborhood policy. There is a number of good practices for maritime patrolling and early warning that the country can use together with its neighbours.
This of course, is only one of the domains of Bulgaria’s security policy. Yet it is a key one, since it is vital for intra-institutional cooperation, administrative reform and the role and prestige of the country in the EU.
The last years showed that the government cannot adequately tackle the lack of security. Human trafficking, smuggling, organized crime, political corruption, unstable or failing states – these are elements of one puzzle. We cannot assemble it the right way only with traditional approach to security and defense. We have to act smart, adopt more comprehensive approach and use the synergy between different aspects of external and internal security. Above all, however, we need the understanding about the surrounding challenges and a strategic vision how to successfully tackle them.
Russia’s new “collective”… defence
At the end of 2008 Russia restarted its lective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Belarus, and Armenia. That is hardly any news, but more interestingly, last week the first training of the reaction force of the rganization took place. While resurgent Russia is obviously trying to counterbalance NATO in the region and get strategic access to the energy-rich authoritarian Central Asia, CSTO also shows grave internal divisions.
Belarus and Uzbekistan did not take part in establishing the Collective Operation Reaction Force (CORF), while Uzbekistan also refused to accept Russian military bases on its territory. Obviously, the Russians tried to punch above their weight and too hastily attempted to return to the times of the Warsaw Treaty.
Still, the military exercises on 16th October in Kazakhstan were impressive – more than 7000 tropps and 90 aircraft participated. Perhaps impressing was the only point of gathering such amount of hard power for a day-excercise. After all, the training was related to interrupting drug-trafficing from Afghanistan, intercepting horseriders and saving hostages. Why would you need even 1000 soldiers for this? The answer is simple – Russia keeps on trying to frustrate the US and NATO with all available means. Those who go further than the CSTO ambitions though, soon will realize that Russia at this point is hardly able to create anything other than just another ‘collective’.
How to make the best of EU’s energy policy?
After the January gas crisis the issue of energy security and gas supply is increasingly discussed in Bulgaria. The country has very energy inefficient economy and is almost 100% dependent on Russian gas imports. This is why the question about Bulgaria’ s participation in the big energy projects is every more relevant. Solving the energy security issues in Bulgaria depends on solving them at European scale. The mega projects Nabucco and South Stream are often mentioned as saviors of EU’s energy security, but they are too expensive and hard to come about politically. Besides, these projects are all about pipes, but not about developing of gas sources and effective distribution. Instead, the EU needs Single Energy Policy and an Energy Regulatory Agency to diced about gas imports, exports and transit at EU-wide level. This is the shortest way to deliver more energy security and to optimize consumption and reserves.
EU’s problems today are not pipelines. They are the following: 1) Huge dependency on Russia (42% of gas imports) and 2) disproportional energy diversification between Eastern and Western Europe. While the dependency on Russia decreases with improvements in renewables and energy efficiency, the second problem remains. It has direct consequences mainly for the new member states, but also creates costs for the old ones. The proper way to address this challenge is to build the necessary interconnection between national gas infrastructures and to create a single regulatory mechanism at community level. Such a mechanism would be responsible for the import and export of gas from country to country and would gather information about the supply, storage, production capacity and consumption needs. In this way with an integrated regulation mechanism would create both political and economic benefits.
Besides having political and economic advantages, liberalizing EU’s energy market improves the Europe’s security. First, the national deficiencies would become European, which will facilitate common positions in energy and foreign policy. Second, the gas security increases in the whole EU because in case of deficiency in one member state, others can easily redirect gas flow. While this is particularly good for the new member states, it also brings political dividend for the old ones because Third: the gas issue would be depoliticized and Russia would not be able to build coalitions in the EU thus splitting the Union in different camps. At this moment this is the biggest weakness of the EU. If this changes though internal integration instruments, it would significantly enhance EU’s standing in the international scene.
Nature knows how to connect important part of one. Do we?
The Fourth reason for market liberalization and community regulation is that if the EU does this successfully, it will give a very good reference point for the rest of the world. This can be of key importance in the long-run as most of the energy-exporting countries have state-owned energy sectors. This is the case with Russia too, whose energy market is functioning thanks to costly government support. With the artificially low domestic prices no one sees a reason to invest in energy efficiency. This leads to great loses. As a result Gazprom gets 100% of its profits from only 25% of the gas it sells – the one that it exports. Furthermore, the Russian state monopoly strongly discourages the opportunities for investments, developing new gas sources and improving the infrastructure. According to the international Energy Agency, Russia should invest around 11 billion USD for maintenance and development of its transport infrastructure. This money is mainly used now for consultancy and new pipelines, while development is totally neglected. Today Russia invests more in the Sochi Olympic Games than in its energy sector. This may create the ironical situation where the richest country in gas will not be out of gas and will not export the contracted amounts.
In fact, we had such a case in winter 2005/6. If we want to avoid that from happening again, we should work for liberalization of energy markets and start from our own! This would smooth the progress of energy efficiency and stronger foreign policy positions. Furthermore, this would not require the huge investments of Nabucco and South Stream. What it requires is political will. If the supporters of a Single Energy policy lose the fight with the lobbies of the construction companies and the bureaucratic dreams, the EU would miss a golden opportunity to make a major step in solving its energy problems.
Liberalization is thus where we should start from. Then diversification of routes and sources would be the cherry of the energy security pie. It will do good to energy security and economy if the new pipelines are carefully thought of. Now they are not. And this makes it even more obligatory to act smart.
Какво липсва на българската сигурност и отбрана в ЕС?
Трудно е да се говори за политика за сигурност в България. По-скоро в последните години има отделни парчета от пъзела на сигурността и отбраната, а вместо политика – управление на проекти. Новото разбиране за сигурността като продукт на вътрешния ред и управлението на международни кризи също не е в дневния ред на водещите институции. Всъщност, ако трябва да съм точен България няма визия за сигурността и отбраната си.
Основни липси
България няма адекватна Национална Стратегия за Сигурност. Документът на Министерството на отбраната (МО) е от 1998 г. Основните приоритети в него, както и във Военната Стратегия (2002) и Военната Доктрина (1999) вече не отразяват адекватно международните проблеми на сигурността. Вместо това цел номер 1 в повечето документи е члеството в НАТО. Изчерпва ли се с това реформата в Българските въоръжени сили и институции отговорни за сигурността? Съвсем не. По-скоро би трябвало да започне оттам.
Един от най-новите стратегически документи – Стратегическият Предглед на Сигурността (2004) – също остава далеч от дебатите между НАТО и Европейската политика за Сигурност и Отбрана (ЕПСО), бъдещето на Европейската сигурност, и дори традиционни за външната ни политка сфери като българския принос в регионалната стабилност. Досегашните ръководства на ключови министерства, особено МО, всячески пренебрегваха въпроса за реформата в НАТО, развитието на младата ЕПСО и ролята на България в тези процеси. Основните проблеми бяха свързани с модернизация, което много тесногръдо се разбираше като купуване на нови оръжия и отбранителни системи. Освен това всеки министър си имаше фикс идея, като недвижими имоти и социални дейности. Така МО се превърна в туроператор и агенция за недвижимости и загърби стратегическото планиране тотално.
Посока на развитие
Липсата на визионерство и разбиране за новата европейска архитектура на сигурността от последните години напоследък се допълниха от дълбока бюджетна криза. Новият екип на Николай Младенов бързо показа, че иска да ревизира сделки, политики и администрация, но това ще отнеме време. Със сигурност ако това усилие успее ще е много добре за институцията. Междувременно обаче можем да мислим как да попълним стратегическата пропаст. Тя е фундаментална за задвижването на модернизацитята в армията и администарцията по последователен и смислен начин, когато има условия за това. И не струва много пари.
Една от най-важните политики, които МО трябва да развие е участието на България в ЕПСО. Защо? Ето няколко основни причини:
- участието в ЕПСО, и осбено във военни операции, осигурява огромен политически престиж, а България в момента е в най-ниската му възможна точка
- ЕПСО дава експедиционен и институционален опит за въоръжените сили и останалите държавни звена по сигурността
- Структурирането на ЕПСО и координацията с НАТО може да служи като ключова отправна точка в реорганизацията на българските сили за сигурност и модернизацията им
- Силно ЕПСО засилва позициите на ЕС като международен актьор и подпомага стабилността в региона (Косово, Грузия, Босна, и др.)
Няколко предложения
На първо място, България трябва да си напише домашното и да обнови стратегията си за сигурност и военната доктрина. Там трябва ясно да се отбележи ролята която България иска за ЕС в света и за себе си в ЕПСО и НАТО. Идната година е много подходяща за това, тъй като в момента тече ревизия на стратегическата концепция на НАТО, а и след влизането на Лисабонския договор в сила ЕПСО ще получи нови институционални измерения, нов върховен представител, президент на Съвета и нови функции. Надявам се отворения подход на новото ръководство на МО да направи този процес достъпен за учените и експерите по външна политика и сигурност от НПО. В последните години те бяха тотално забравени и експертизата натрупана до 2004 г. започна да избледнява. Ако този процес продължи, това ще струва скъпо в дългосрочен план.
Второ, традиционните стратегически документи трябва да се допълнят със специална стратегия за участето на България в мисии зад граница и особено за ролята която страната иска да играе в ЕПСО. Така България ще се откъсне от ad hoc подхода към международната сигурност и европейската интеграция и присъствието с по 1-2 офицери в мисии в Африка.
Трето, необходим е кохерентен план за развитието на военните и цивилни способности при управление на кризи. Настоящата кадрова политика на МО не отразява новите предизвикателства, както и уроците от ключови международни операции в Босна, Косово, Афганистан и Ирак. Съзаване на ефективни звена готови да поемата цивилно-военни задачи в международни операции изисква нова междуинституционална политика. Планът за развитието на военни и цивилни способности трябва да включва МВР, преструтурираното министерство на бедствията и авариите, Министерство на Правосъдието и МО. Тези институции трябва да работят заедно по подготовката на специализирани цивилно-военни екипи, готови за участие в мисии по наблюдение, state-building, реформа на сектора за сигурност, обучение и т.н.
Освен това, четвърто, с оглед финансовите възможности, българия трябва да предложи ниши за оперативна подкрепа в цивилните аспекти на ЕПСО (по подобие на нишите в НАТО). Това не е по-лесно, но със сигурност е много по-евтино, тъй като за военното си участие в мисии България плаща сама, докато за цивилното, разходите се покриват от ЕС. Подобна инициатива е логично да е под шапкана на Министерството на Отбраната, но преди това е необходим ясен координационен механизъм с останалите институции.
Пето, планът за развитие на цивилните способности трябва да се обсъди с други държави в ЕС и ако има съгласие този процес да обхване планирането на цивилните способности в ЕС като цяло. Още по-добре би било, ако България лобира за създаване на общностен процес на стандартизация за цивилинте способност.
Макар и малка, натрупана експертиза от участие в мисии трябва да се използва максимално. Ето защо е необходимо (Шесто) създаването на звено за добри практики в международни операции към МО. То може да създава своя експертиза на база проучвания и натрупан опит в мисии и институционална реформа в други държави. Важно е да се знае че дори в Съвета на ЕС няма такова звено. Безкритичността към мисиите и статуквото около Солана до голяма степен пречи на по-динамичното развитие на ЕПСО.
Седмо, България трябва да насърчава Черноморската политика, която е естествен фокус на политиката за добросъседство. Тя се рестартира всяка година с ново име, което подсказва че нещата не вървят по вода. България е граница на ЕС и има огромен интерес да използва традиционните си връзки, географско положение и опита си за да развива и играе ключова роля в тази политика. Румъния е приоритизирала това. В ЕС съществуват редица добри практики за сътрудничество в областта на системите за ранно предупреждение и морско наблюдение, които може да се използват.
Това, разбира се, е само една от плоскостите на развитие за българската сигурност. Тя обаче е ключова, както за разбирателството между институциите в страната, така и за нейите роля и престиж в ЕС.
Последните години показаха че държавата е безсилна да се справи с липсата на сигурност. Трафик на хора и стоки, организирана престъпност, политическа корупция, нестабилна държавност в региона и т.н. – това са все елементи от един и същ пъзел. С него не можем да се справим с традиционните методи на вътрешната сигурност или отбраната. Трябва да действаме умно и да използваме синергията между тях. Но преди всичко да трябва имаме визията за проблемите които ни заобикалят.
Ethnicity, Democracy and Human Rights – A Turkish Bulgarian Saga (Part 1 )
It has been twenty years after the Eastern European Countries opened for liberalism and democracy. For two decades they are having various degrees of success, but in most of them there is no alternative undemocratic project. This year the European Commission issued a short video commemorating the struggles of East European Societies for rights and freedom which they eventually achieved. Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1961, Poland’s Solidarnost, etc, – they are all there. Bulgaria is the only country of the new member states that is not in this video. Here I present the only reason why it may have been included – the revolt of Bulgarian Muslims and Bulgarian Turks against communist oppression in the late 80s. Controversy, the first and only out loud desire for human and civil rights has left scars that still divide Bulgarian society and have serious imprint over the current political system.
Communist style “Revival”
Bulgarian Communism was equally oppressive against majority Bulgarians, as well as the ethnic Turk minority, the Bulgarian Muslims (Pomaks), and the Roma people. In the early 80s the Communist party commenced what it cynically called “revival process” – a set of assimilation policies targeted at Bulgarian Turks and Bulgarian Muslims. In the course of a few years these minorities’ rights to speak their mother tongue and to go to mosques were even more severely infringed. It did not happen without opposition, but the totalitarian state used all its humiliating mechanism to impose its disgraceful policy. The official doctrine said that the Muslims in Bulgaria are ethnic Bulgarians, who have been forcefully converted to Islam and brainwashed over 500 years of Turkish rule (1396-1878). So hundreds of years later the communist dictatorship offered them to go back to their Bulgarian roots and organized their “revival”.
The peak of this “revival period” was in 1984 and 1985 when the communist authorities forcefully changed the names of Bulgarian Turks and Bulgarian Muslims. It is horrific how one day you go to work and your boss gives you a list of names you have to chose for you and all your family. The local police intimidates you even before you can resist. No arguments, no disagreement. You either change your name and forget your identity, or your life is made a hell. In a country with no free media and with closed borders, where people do not have the right to change residence, this seems quite a nightmare. And it was – a few hundred thousand people changed their names en mass and had to face continuous humiliation, often forced relocation and eat the humble pie in their small majority-dominated communities.
In the words of a participant in the “revival” “They did not want us as we were the day before ‘yesterday’. They wanted us like them, but we could not become like them overnight. Not that way, not after they caused us. The regime made a big mistake… and we were faced with something that could not end ‘alright’. We were brought back in the middle ages. Few people today realize that the ethnic fear rooted in those years of dark and obscure communist rule”.
Going against the regime
The repressions continued after 1985, but the victims of the “revival” started to gradually organize their opposition. Peaceful associations for human rights were created undercover; protests started to erupt and at places turned into riots. After a terrorist attack killed 8 people (including children) and injured dozens, the security forces took the initiative – many people were detained and armed police increased its presence in small towns and villages. This only exacerbated the tensions and soon the repressed minorities clashed violently with the police and army. In months the riots spread in many minority-populated areas and involved tens of thousands angry men and women going out at the streets in a desperate fight to assert their dignity. In 1988 Amnesty International claims to have a list of 100 names of people who had been killed in the riots and hundreds others injured and detained.
Whether the Muslim-Turkish opposition was grass root or sponsored by Turkey’s espionage (see Part 2) remains unclear – perhaps the truth lies in between. It is not unimportant issue, but what is more important is that the Bulgarian Turks and Muslims rose against the regime that tried to erase with force their existential differences. Maybe this happened with some underground support by a neighbouring state, but this matters less. It is also of little relevance that the majority did not support the movement for rights and freedom (later the name of the Turkish party in Bulgaria) and that there were no media to broadcast the repressions.
The Great Excursion
At the beginning of 1989 the situation was hard to control and the authorities took the radical measure to expatriate “several hundred thousand Bulgarian Turks before Bulgaria turn into Cyprus”. This was one of the biggest human tragedies in contemporary Balkan history. Many people left the country where they were born and took the way to the unknown. Most of these people had some distant relatives in Turkey and successfully found refuge. Others are assumed to have considered this forceful relocation an opening of the borders and a better opportunity. But this hardly brightens the societal scars left from the communist-sponsored ‘revival’. On the one hand there is the obvious tragedy of hundreds of thousands people who revolted against the establishment and were literally sent off. On the other hand is the post-communist story of those who stayed –both the repressed minority and the majority.
Democracy
At the time of the events described above no body knew that the Berlin Wall was going to fall in just a few months. Democracy was given a chance to shine upon Bulgaria. But this was already a different Bulgaria. It was a country with deeply divided society, with ethnic tensions brought by clumsy and inhumane dictatorial policy. In 1991 the communist regime was gone (or at least started to reform) but its last years gave birth to something which was going to undermine Bulgaria democracy for at least two more decades… something which was never going to turn into an alternative project but would gradually undermine its fragile foundations election after election and year after year.
To be continued….
Bulgaria’s reversible democracy
Bulgaria is not trying to be the Switzerland of the Balkans any more. In the past such slogans may have channeled some energy for overcoming the burden of the communist heritage, but today they are a mere disguise for what one would call democratic reversal in one of the newest EU member states.
A month ago Freedom House Europe issued a report on Bulgaria as part of the Nations in Transit 2009 survey. One of its main points was that democracy in Bulgaria is not irreversible. This year was the first since the beginning of the post-communist transition, in which the country’s rating for democracy, was decreased by Freedom House Europe. According to the report “many efforts are still needed to make Bulgarian democracy irreversible and vital”. And there are reasons for this. The last government did many remarkably undemocratic things before the July elections.
To start with, phones of MPs and journalists have been tapped by the newly-created State Agency for National Security (SANS). The agency, which is directly subordinated to the Prime Minister, publicly refused information to the Parliament about the case on a number of occasions. This reinforced the accusations that SANS is turning form anti-corruption body to political police. In fact this scandal was not an isolated precedent in SANS actions against journalists. Last year the agency shut down a website, which criticized the government and published details about the life of high officials in the government and security services. Shortly afterwards, an investigative journalist Ognyan Stefanov whose name made a stir in the website shut down, was nearly killed in a brutal assault. The perpetrators remain unknown to date while the prosecution office stopped the investigation.
While the government was creating political police and the organized crime acted with impunity, the cabinet made resolute steps to restrict the citizen’s right of protest. Months before the general elections a new law stipulated that rallies are illegal if organized in the vicinities of government buildings and in the center of the capital. This act came after half a year of weekly demonstrations organized by farmers, industrialists, workers and opposition parties. The latter were obstructed to participate on an equal footing in the political process with a number of legislative and judicial tricks plotted by the ruling coalition.
Puppet Show
These among other examples made many in Bulgaria think that the July elections were last chance for the fragile democracy in the country. The opposition victory seemed like a breath of fresh air, but soon after the inauguration of the new government, indications of undemocratic behavior reappeared. The first one came when the Prime Minister Boyko Borisov called back one of his party’s MPs. Todor Yosifov a.k.a. “The Maniak”, a virtually unknown former hip-hop performer, came under media attack for his “gangsta lyrics” from 10 years ago. He was quickly substituted with another MP-candidate from the same region.
Soon after this scandalous decision, a former agent in the communist security services was appointed minister for the Bulgarians living overseas. In a country deeply divided about its communist past and the brutalities of the former regime’s secret services, this was a step clearly not in the right direction.
Doging bullets (and justice)
New Bullets: Zvone Lavric, Slovenia
In fact the question of security service reform is inextricably related to democracy in the whole former communist block. Often the unreformed security services undermine the newly-established democratic principles, while still using totalitarian thinking in both their internal affairs and public interactions. The rule of law is such a principle which every democratic country should assert. However, the new Bulgarian minister of interior Tsvetanov these days publicly backed 5 policemen sentenced for beating to death a detained suspect a few years ago. The Ministry of interior has a good record in pardoning and defending its officers who regularly commit police violence, but so far there has not been such obvious political pressure against already announced sentences before their appeal. A few days afterwards, minister Tsvetanov announced a plan for rearming Bulgarian police and introducing combat ammunitions and deadlier bullets.
Such public announcements are no different from last government’s anti-democratic practices. There are reasons to be afraid that they are grounded in the same unreformed totalitarian understanding about political and human rights, typical for the communist era. Regrettably, the above examples are not isolated cases, but carefully selected points of Bulgarian democracy’s downward curve. It remains to be seen whether the last year was a turning point for democracy in Bulgaria.
It seems that so far criminals could stop a policeman’s bullets like Neo from The Matirx. That was a problem. With this year’s undemocratic upgrades we may soon witness a bigger problem though – an EU member state living in a computer program called “Democracy” while being governed by the same principles that we dumped 20 years ago.
21st Century (anti)Democracies
Defining democracy seems to be a hard thing to do. 20 years ago, when the Berlin Wall was still splitting Germany into two, it was easy to say what democracy was and what not.
On one hand we had total control over populations, while on the other hand were elected governments, accountability, and powerful civil societies.
Today things are a little more complicated: everybody seems to be democratic or, better say, everybody is creating democracy of their own style and preferences. As Freedom House’s report Undermining democracy points out, 21st century authoritarians have developed subtle strategies to dent true democratic principles. One example is Russia, whose “sovereign democracy” leaves plenty of vague space for any repressive regime to fill in with whatever fits best. When coupled with nostalgic nationalism, shutting down independent media, and one-party system, “sovereign democracy” does not seem so democratic any more. Another example is the “Islamic democracy” of Iran, which also holds regular elections for president and legislature, but whose entire political and social life is decided in the small circle around the Ayatollahs. Nevertheless, these regimes present themselves as democracies despite the lack of accountability and internal legitimacy, political repressions, murders of journalists and deplorable human rights record. After this inexcusable fallacy comes unconditional foreign aid. IT targets developing countries from the neighborhood and Africa, which are supposed to follow suit and disregard the US and EU investments, which always come with the conditions to democratize and liberalize.
Why should this matter? Unlike 20 years ago, today’s battle is not who has more nuclear warheads or who will get the oil in Africa. The real war is between those who advocate for the right of every individual to live free and choose his own destiny, and those who are ready to neglect these rights for the sake of power, prosperity and ruling comfort. And while 20 years ago we had a war, albeit a cold one, today we have working “international institutions” and “economic integration”. Correction: international institutions, whose work is vetoed by authoritarian governments and economic integration at the price of neglecting political and human rights.
The term democracy has been blurred by authoritarian propaganda so much, and the democratic governments have been so immersed in business with authoritarians, that we have somehow swept the real fight under the carpet. Is it inconvenient any more to stand firm for the right of man to choose undisturbed how to pursue his happiness? Is it indispensable to allow authoritarian regimes undermine democracy through their newly-arisen economic strength?
Today’s resurgent authoritarian governments make it indeed essential to have a stance. Today if you have no position, you are in the camp of the perpetrators of human dignity and freedom. It is easy to point at Russia and Iran for undermining democracy at home and abroad. These countries have long been in manifest opposition to liberal democratic principles. Other countries are more moderate, but equally authoritarian. And they still call themselves democracies.
Take the following example. Myanmar is ruled by a brutally suppressive military junta since 1962. Since then the regime has detained thousands of opposition activists and murdered many of them with no CNN cameras around. No elections have been held. The whole power is vested in the military, which arbitrarily decides about the life and wellbeing of every Burmese. The totalitarian socialism brought the country to the admittance as world’s most undeveloped nation. Oover 90% of the population lives on less than 65 cent per day. The military dictatorship severely represses political opposition and even peaceful movements of Buddhist monks.
To make the long story short, the West reacts with unsuccessful sanctions which impoverish the country even more, while the neighbours trade and arm the junta. Remarkably, among those indirectly supporting the regime in Myanmar are democratic India and Thailand.
shooting against freedom
Last year the junta made new virtually unamendable constitution and this year announced elections for 2010. Democratic steps? It also pardoned a lot of criminals and some prisoners of conscious, only to incarcerate them again afterwards. Already under house arrest, the democratic icon of the country San Suu Kyi was sentenced to 3 years in prison. Then the sentenced was reduced to 1,5 years house arrest. These are only some of the sly PR campaigns of one of the most repressive regimes in the world, which does not intend to change. However, it may well gain external legitimacy and call itself democratic after carrying out staged elections next year. We will then have another type of democracy, perhaps “militarized democracy” or “The Burmese democratic way”.
In any case the advocates of freedom should stay alert for the cunning ways of the 21st century authoritarians. We are still fighting the same battle, only the enemy has changed its name and methods.
